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ABSTRACT
Given the important role that school district administrators
play in the educational process, one might expect their
'performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both
how much students learn and the cost of public education to
taxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of
merit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been
directed to the methods by which school administrators are
compensated.
This paper provides evidence on whether school superin-
tendents are explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their
"performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities
for mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school
'districts in New Ycrk State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period.
Measures of performance are defined and then entered into salary
level, salary change, and mobility equations. While evidence is
provided that school superintendents are rewarded for
"performance", the magnitude of the rewards appear to be quite
small.
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2I. Introduction
The April 1983 report of the National Comission on
Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk, focused public
attention on the need to reform public education. Among its most
hotly debated proposals was one to institute merit pay plans for
teachers; this in spite of the fact that historically merit pay
plans have not met with much success in public education, at
least partially because there are characteristics of public
I
education that make their implementation problematic.
Somewhat surprisingly, less attention has been directed to
the important role that educational administrators (school
principals and superintendents) play in the educational process
and their methods of compensation. Given their key roles in a
variety of areas,includirig the recruitment and continual
motivation of teachers, the design of curriculum, the setting of
educational goals, and their management of school district
resources, one might expect administrators' "performance" to be
of fundamental importance in determining both how much students
learn and the cost of public educat1on to taxpayers.2 Yet there
has been little public call for formal merit pay plans for school
administrators. This is somewhat puzzling because studies of
individual (as opposed to group) merit or incentive pay plans in
the for-profit sector of the economy find that they tend to be
concentrated at upper levels of management, where fundamental
policy and managerial decisions are made, rather than covering
all employees.3
3In fact, while there is a voluminous literature on the
determinants of teachers" salaries, we know little about the
forces that influence the compensation of school administrators.4
In particular, we have little evidence about whether they are
explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their "performance" by
higher compensation and/or greater opportunities for mobility to
higher paying positions.5 Such evidence is clearly important for
policy debate; unless there is evidence that school
administrators' compensation is at least implicitly tied to. their
"performance", a case can be made that consideration should be
given to building incentives for performance explicitly into
their compensation arrangements.
To shed evidence on these issues, this paper presents
analyses of the compensation and mobility of school
superintendents in New York State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83
period.6 Our analyses are based on a unique longitudinal data
base we have assembled that include the salary and name of the
school superintendent in each school district in the state (over
700) each year during the flve-yar period. Coupled with data
from a variety of other sources, these data enable us to estimate
the extent to which, across districts at a point in time, a
superintendent's salary is related to characteristics of the
school district (e.g., community wealth and adult educational
attainment), characteristics of the superintendent (e.g.,
educational attainment and experience), and measures of the
superintendent's "performance". Similarly, they enable us to
4estimate the extent to which superintendents' salary changes and
probabilities of mobility, are related to "performance".
Of course, a crucial element in our study is the definition
of "performance's. While school districts and their school board
members are idiosyncratic arid, as we demonstrate below, evaluate
superintendents' performance in a wide variety of ways, our
methodology is to focus on a few well—defined outcomes.
Specifically, we assume that school districts value high
educational performance and low school tax rates, each relative
to the comparable outcome in "similar" school districts in the
state.7 Specifically, we define performance by contrasting
actual student test scores and the tax rate for each district in
a year to predicted values obtained from regression equations in
which each outcome is specified to be a function of
characteristicsof the district (e.g., income level, wealth,
adult education levels, racial mix). Such a methodology proved
useful in a previous study conducted by one of us that dealt with
the compensation of city—managers, police chiefs and fire
ch I ef
We begin in the next section by presenting background data
on the salaries and mobility of school superintendents in New
York State, along with estimates of cross-section superintendent
salary equations that exclude performance measures. Based upon a
survey we conducted of all school superintendents in New York
State, section III discusses the criteria superintendents believe
are used in their evaluations and, with these results in mind,
'5
discusses the perrormance measures actuaHy used in this study.
Section IV then presents our estimates of the effects of
performance in one year on the next year's salary level for
superintendents who remain in the same district, as well as our
estimates of the effects of performance and changes in
performance on the salary changes of superintendents who remain
in the same district or move to another school district in the
state. The next section presents estimates of the relationship
between the mobility of school superintendents and their
performance. Finafly, Section VI presents some brief concluding
remarks.
II. Salaries and Nobility of School Superintendents in New York
State. 1978-79 to 1982-83: Some Preliminary naivses
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 on school
superintendents' salaries in New York State during the five
academic year period that our data cover. There are over 700
public school districts in New York State and excluded from the
data each year are New York City, districts in which the position
is vacant, and districts that failed to report salary
information. The meai salary of superintendents in the sample
rose from slightly under $35,000 in 1978—79 to over $44,000 in
1982-83. Each year the variation in salaries across districts
was large: for example in 1982—83 superintendents in the state
earned between $20,000 and $71,000, with the standard deviation
in salaries equalling almost $10,000. Much of this variation is
clearly due to the wicie variation of school district sizes in the
6sample, however, as we demonstrate below, other factors are also
important.
Background data on the mobility of school superintendents in
the state is found in Table 2. From our data, we can track if a
superintendent remained in the same school district for two
consecutive years, moved from one district to another school
district in the state during the period, or moved from one school
district in the state to "out of sample" status. In the latter
case, the superintendent may have retired or died, may have moved
to another superintendency outside of New York State, may have
moved to a different educational position (nonsuperintendent) in
another district in the state, or may have switched to a
noneducational position. Alternatively, his school district may
simply have failed to report data In the second year.
The data in Table 2 suggest that the annual turnover rates
'of school superintendents are low, as each year between 81 and 88
percent of the superintendents continued in their current job.
Only 4 to 6 percent of the superintendents moved to another
district In the state, while 8 to 13 percent of the superin-
tendents dropped out of the sample each year. In Section V we
attempt to explain, using multinomlal logit analyses, the
determinants of which of these three "states' a superintendent is
In each year. Since our data do not permit us to distinguish
among the variety of reasons that an Individual winds up in the
'out of sample" state, not surprisingly our ability to "explain"
9
why individuals wind up in It is limited.
7Ignoring "performance" for a moment, what are the forces one
might expect to influence a superintendent's salary? On the one
hand, one might expect that the characteristics of the school
district should matter as larger districts (where a
superintendent's job Is more difficult), wealthier districts (who
can afford to pay more), districts that contain a high proportion
of highly educated adults (who are likely to have a strong
"taste" for education), and districts whose students have special
educational needs (such as those with a large proportion of
minority students), are all likely to pay higher salaries in an
effort to attract and retain high quality superintendents. On
the other hand, characteristics of the superintendent should also
matter, as more experienced and more highly educated
superintendents are likely to be able to command higher salaries.
Table 3 reports our attempts to see if these forces do
matter. Estimates of annual cross—section saVry equations of
the form
(1) lo(W) = a0+ a1X1 + a2S +
where W is the annual salary of the superintendent, X is a
vector of school district characteristics, S is a vector of
characteristics of the superintendent, and is a random error
term, are reported there.
As noted in the table, the school district data used in the
analyses come from a variety of federal and state sources. The
characteristics of the superintendents come from two volumes of
Who's Who in Educational dministration, the directory of members
8of the American Association of School Administrators, and the
responses to a survey of all school superintendents employed in
New York State in 1984-85, that was conducted by the authors in
late May to early July of 1985. Because less than half.of the
superintendents in the sample belonged to the professional
association and the response rate of incumbents in 1984-85 to the
survey (and a follow-up for nonrespondent) was about 70 percent,
there was a substantial number of observations with missing data
on some, or all, of the superintendents' characteristics. We
also could not obtain school district characteristics data for
some of the districts. As a result, we excluded observations
from the sample If either the school district's characteristics
or the superintendent's degree information was missing.1° As
Table 3 indicates, this reduces our sample sizes to between 550
and 600 observations each year.
As expected, the characteristics of school districts prove
to be important determinants of superintendents' salaries.
Ceteris paribus, in each year larger districts (as measured by
the logarithm of total enrollment (X1)), wealthier districts (as
measured by the logarithms of property values per enrolled
student (X2)), per capita personal income in the county (X3), or
census year (1979) median family income in the school district
(X4)), and districts that place a high value on education (as
measured by the percentage of the district's adult population
with greater than a college degree (X6)) all are associated with
higher superintendents' salaries.
9In contrast, only two of the superintendents' charac-
teristics. years of tenure in the current district (S4) and
years since receiving a bachelor's degree (S5) —— the latter a
rough proxy for- age —— prove to be statistically significant.
Moreover, quantitatively the effects of these variables are very
small, with the rate of returnper year of tenure being roughly
0.6 percent and that per year of age being roughly 0.2 percent.
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the possession of a doctorate
degree (S1) or a certificate of advanced study in administration
(S2) —- the latter an intermediate degree between a masters and a
doctorate —— nor the total number of years of previous experience
as a superintendent in other school districts, systematically are
associated with salary.11
Of course, it is well-known, and the results of our survey
confirm, that the typical mobility pattern of a superintendent
(at least during the early stages of his career) is from smaller
to larger and/or from poorer to wealthier districts. If this is
the case, these personal characteristics variables may affect
salary indirectly via influencing the characteristics of the
school district in which the superintendent is located, rather
than directly influencing his salary level, given his district's
character ist 1 cs,
To test this hypothesis, the logarithm of property value per
enrolled student and the logarithm of total enrollment in the
superintendent's district were each regressed on the personal
characteristics of the superintendent (excluding years of tenure
10
in the current district). The results are reported for each year
in Table 4. [-laying a doctorate degree, having more prior
experience as a superintendent in other districts, and being
older, al I are associated with employment in larger school
districts, while having a doctorate degree also is associated
with being employed in wealthier districts.
These latter findings have important implications for the
analyses that follow of the relationship between compensation and
performance. For even if within a given school district one was
to find no relationship between a superintendent's compensation
and his performance, superintendents might still be rewarded for
performance by increased opportunities for mobility to better
paying positions.
111. Evaluating the 'Performance° of School Superintendents
We measure the performance of a school superintendent in
this paper by his success in keeping school tax rates low and
educational test scores high in his district, both relative to
these outcomes in "comparable" districts in the state. It Is
natural to ask how these measures correspond to the criteria that
superintendents believe school boards actually use? To answer
this question, the survey of school superintendents that we
conducted asked the respondents to list the criteria they
believed their school boards used in their evaluation.12 In
cases where a formal evaluation instrument existed, the
superintendent was asked to attach it to his response.13
11
Approximately 80 percent of the respondents to our survey (397 of
496) included a list of criteria in their response and about 25
percent of these (86) attached formal evaluation instruments.
A preliminary scanning of the responses suggested that the
criteria mentioned could be classified into twelve broad
categories and a count was made of the number of times each
category was mentioned. These responses are tabulated in Table
5; since most superintendents mentioned more than one category,
the total count across categories far exceeds the number of
respondents.
Most striking, and somewhat depressing (at least to us!),
the most commonly mentioned criteria were community/public
relations and school board relations. Fiscal management (the
category that would Include keeping tax rates low) came in fourth
on the list andwas mentioned by about two-thirds of the
respondents. Academic performance and achievement, (the category
in which keeping test scores high would fall) was eighth on the
list and was mentioned by less than one—third of the respondents.
What are the implications of these findings for the use of
the objective performance measures that we propose? On the one
hand, It Is hard to envision objective measures that are readily
available for the other ten criteria; measures of fiscal
management and academic performance and achievement may be the
best one can do. On the other hand, It Is clear that the
specific measures we use are measured with considerable error;
If these errors are random the coefficients of our performance
12
variables will be biased towards zero in the compensation and
mobility equations. Furthermore, given that more than twice as
many respondents mentioned fiscal management as did academic
performance, one might expect that, on average, the former will
prove to be more important than the latter In explaining
compensation and mobility.
To give the reader a feel for how the performance measures
were actually constructed, Table 6 presents estimates of tax rate
and educational outcome equations for 1979-80 (separate equations
were estimated for each year and the results are very similar
across years). The tax rate variable is the logarithm of the
full—value property tax rate In the school district. The
educational outcome variables are the logarithms of the
percentage of the district's students who fall below the state
reference point on a standardized sixth grade mathematics
examination and the average percentage who feYf below the state
reference point on standardized third and sixth grade reading and
mathematics examinations.14 Students who fall below the state
reference point are deemed to require remedial services and state
aid is increased to help fund these services. Since these
outcome scores measure the proportion who Ufaili these tests, we
are focusing on the bottom tail of the academic achievement
15
di str ibut ion.
For each of these three outcomes (0), equations were
estimated of the form
(2) log O = b0 + b1Z + J = 1,2,3
13
where Z is a vector 0± school district characteristics expected
to influence these outcomes and u i a random error term. In
tact, the variables in Z are assumed to e identical to those
that enter the superintendent salary equation CX), save that a
(1,0) "city school district" dummy variable replaces the
continuous size of district variable. In the large city school
districts in New York State the property tax rate is set by an
elected school board (subject to constitutional limitations),
while in the smaller school districts the tax rate is set each
year by a voter referendum. One might conjecture, ceteris
paribus, that in the latter situation direct voter control will
lead to lower tax rates.
In the main, the estimates in Table 6 conform to our
expectations and provide reasonable explanations of the tax rates
and test scores. For example, with respect to tax rates,
wealthier (X2 districts have lower tax rates, presumably because
lower rates are required to raise any given level of revenue,
richer in terms of current income (X4) districts have higher tax
rates, districts with higher proportions of nonwhites (X5), and
thus special needs, have higher tax rates, and drstricts with
S
higher proportions of adults with more than a college education
(X6), and presumably greater taste for ecucat ion. have higher tax
rates.
Similarly, with respect to test scores, wealthier districts,
districts with higher current income and districts with highly
educated adults. ceteris paribus. all have lower failure rates on
14
the tests, while districts with a higher proportion of nonwhites
have higher failure rates. Failure rates, but not tax rates,
also appear to be higher in the "cityTM school districts. It is
worth noting that the equation used to predict the average test
failure rate "flts" much better than the equation used to predict
the sixth grade math test failure rate. While it would be
preferable to use the former in our analysis, as noted above
(footnote 14) only the latter can be used in analyses that
exploit the longitudinal nature of the data.
Given these estimated coefficients (corresponding to
b0J
and b1 in (2)), one can obtain estimated values of the
logarithm of each outcome for each school district (i) from
(3) log O. = b0+ b1. Z. J = 1,2,...3.
The school district (='s super•Intendent's) performance Is
then defined as the difference between the predicted and actual
values of the log of each outcome.
(4) P1 = log — log j = 1,2,...3.
Positive values of P indicate positive performance for the
superintendent, as positive values would occur only when
predicted tax rates (or failure rates on tests) would exceed
actual tax rates (or failure rates on tests) in the school
district.
15
It is worth reemphasizing that ?> (3) and (4> are estimated
separately each year. Thus, the structural equations that
generate the performance measures are allowed to vary acrosg
years, as are the estimates of tax and test score performance in
the district. This allows us to focus on the effects of changes
in performance on changes in salaries and mobility in places
be I ow.
IV. Salary Levels. Salary Chances. and Performance
We begin our analyses of the relationship between
superintendents' performance and salaries by focusing on
Individuals who remained in the same position for two consecutive
years, asking if estimates of their performance in the first year
influenced their salary levels in the second year.16
Specifically, we estimate equations of the form
(5) log = a0 + a1X + a2S1 + a3T11
+ a4E1_1 +
where Tjt_i Is our measure of the "tax performance" of the
superintendent In period t—1, Ejt_i Is our measure of the
TMeducatlonal test score performance" (either the sixth grade math
test or the average of all the tests) of the superintendent in
period t—1, and all other variables are defined as before (see
Table 3). Equation (5) is estimated separately for each of the
last four academic years in our sample (t = 1979—80, 1980—81,
16
1981-82, and 1982-83) and for the four years data pooled
together; in the latter case, separate intercept terms for each
year are included in the model.17 Given our definitions of
performance, the coefficients a3 and a4 are expected to be
positive.
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients of the
performance variables from these models; the coefficients of the
other explanatory variables are virtually identical to the
coefficients that appear In Table 3. Taken together, especially
when one focuses on the pooled results, these coefficients
suggest that while higher educational performance is associated
with higher superintendents' salaries as expected, higher tax
performance is associated with lower superintendents' salaries
for this sample of stayers. How can one reconcile these
apparently contradictory findings?
On the one hand, one might argue that the labor market for
superintendents is not operating totally in the manner that we
expected. On the other hand, and we prefer this explanation, one
might argue that our model may be imperfectly specified and that
some important explanatory variable that belongs in the vector X
has been omitted from the model. That is, our estimates are
subject to omitted variable bias.
To see this, suppose there is some unobserved variable,
which we denote by V1, that measures the intensity of a
connunity's feelings about the importance of education and the
will.ingnessof the community to pay a high salary to attract a
17
first—rate superintendent, and that this variable is riot fully
controHed for by the X's In our model. Hence, the Hcorrectu
model should be
(6) log Wj.t= a + + + 3tT1t_i
+ 4tE1t_i + V +
Districts with high values of V are also likely to tax
themselves at higher rates to support education than other
districts, ceteris paribus. As a result, our estimated tax
performance measure will be low in these districts and the
partial correlation between T and V will be negative.
Similarly, districts with high values of V, where more
resources than predicted are devoted to education, are also
likely, ceteris paribus, to be districts in which student test
scores are high and fewer students fall below .he state norm on
the standardized tests. As a result, our estimated test score
performance measures will be high In these districts and the
partial correlations between E and V will be positive. It Is
straightforward to show that if one estimates (5) rather than
(6), omitting V1t, the tax performance coefficient will be
biased in a negative direction and the educational performance
coefficients biased in a positive direction.18 One can thus not
be sure how to interpret the coefficients In Table 7•19
Of course, If one is willing to assume that the V1, do not
vary over time In a given district (Vit=Vj). an innocuous
assumption given the short time span of our data, equation (6)
18
becomes a fixed-effects type of model.20 At first glance, an
apparent solution to the omitted variable bias that may be
present, is to treat all parameters (save for the intercept
terms) as constant and first—difference to obtain.
(7) log (Wt/W1t_i) = a0t + a1(Xjt—Xit_i) +
+ c13(T1ti—Tt_2) +
+
Equation (7) can be estimated directly and, since V1 does not
appear in it, unbiased estimates of a3 and a4 obtained.
That is, one can estimate the extent to which changes in
performance are associated with changes in salary.
Unfortunately, matters are not always as simple as might
appear at first glance; equation (7) must be modified for two
reasons. First, as noted in Table 2, each year some
superintendents move to new jobs within New York State and others
drop out of the sample. Since we have subsequent earnings data
for the former, we can include them in the analyses and allow the
effects of all of the right—hand side variables in the model to
differ for movers and stayers; this will enable us to estimate
the effect of mobility within the sample per se on earnings
growth.21 However, we must stress that selectivity problems
abound here, whether a superintendent moves to another district
in the state or drops out of our sample presumably are not random
events. To econometrically model this joint wage-change-job-
19
change-leave—the-sample process would be extraordinarily complex,
especially so since both school boards arid superintendents are
involved in the decision process. In the remainder of this
section, for empirical tractability we ignore sample drop—outs
and treat within-sample mobility as exogenous, while in the next
section we analyze mobility directly.
Second, if equation (6) is Indeed the true model, then
changes in salary should be related to changes in performance, as
In (7). However, it is not obvious that the specification in (6)
is correct, for it is conceivable that school districts may want
to reward superintendents for keeping performance high, even if
It is not improving. So, for example, as long as educational
test scores in a district are 10 percent above their predicted
value, the superintendent might receive an above average salary
Increase, even if he simply Is maintaining the existing
differential. Because of this, in what follow we also estimate
models that include performance levels as explanatory variables,
as well as those that include performance changes.
Table 8 presents estimates of several salary change
equations for superintendents who remained in the sample over two
consecutive years. Column (1) presents the simplest model;
salary change is postulated there to be a function only of year
dummy variables arid a dichotomous variable for whether the
superintendent changed jobs (1=yes, 0=no) during the period.22
The results in this column suggest that mobility mattered; on
average superintendents whQ changed jobs received salary
20
increases tnat were 6 percent higher than those who remained in
the same position. To say that on average umovers gain is not
to say, however, that mobility always pays. In fact
approximately one-fifth of the movers each year failed to
increase their salaries; some of these suffered salary losses as
large as 30 percent.
Columns (2)-(4) present the results of estimating variants
of equation (7). Each specification includes the changes in the
logarithms of income, enrollment, and full value of property per
student in the district, as well as the tax and educational
pertormance measures.23 The coefficient of each of these
variables is allowed to differ between movers and stayers. As
discussed in Section III. since we are now exploiting the
longitudinal nature of the data, the only educational performance
measure that can be used is that based on the sixth grade math
test; this was the only test that did not change during the five-
year period.
Three different forms of the performance measures are used.
In the specification in column (2) we use the change in
performance measures. So, for example, if we are looking at the
salary change from 1979-80 to 1980—81, the relevant performance
change measures would be those from 1978-79 to 1979-80. Columns
(3) and (4) use level of performance measures. The former uses
the base year errormance measures; in our example, 1979-80. The
latter uses a lagoed year performance measure; in our example,
1978-79.
21
Turning to the results, in these specifications. ceteris
par-ibus. movers suffer salary losses in the range of 5 to 6
oercenz relative to superintendents who don't change jobs. This
occurs cecause among the other things held constant here are
school district income, enrollment, and wealth per student. In
fact, the changes in each of these variables is positively
associated with salary changes for movers (but for stayers).
Hence, in order for superintendents to gain from mobility, they
must move to either higher income, larger, or wealthier school
districts 24
At first glance, column (2) suggests that the change in math
performance is perversely negatively associated with the
superintendents salary change for stayers. However, when the
base year and lagged year math performance index are included as
separate variables (not reported here) both prove to be
statistically insignificant. Moreover, columns (3) and (4)
S
suggest that the negative association between salary change and
math test perrormance change occurs primarily because the laed
leve' of math performance is positively associated with the
salary change. To show that the lagged level is indeed the
relevant variable that should enter into the salary change
equation, a discussion of the timing of these variables is in
order.
eturning to our example, suppose again that we are trying
to explain the determinants of the 1979—80 to 1980—81 salary
change for a superintendent. The base year math test (for 1979-
22
80) was given in the sr-ing of 1980 and the district might have
received its own test results back shortly thereafter. There is
very little chance, however, that it would have received data on
the test scores in other districts in the state prior to the next
academic year (the fall of 1980). Such information wouldhave
come too late to be used in the process of deciding the
superintendents salary for 1980-81; presumably such a decision
would have to have been made prior to the fall of 1980. So, in
fact, neither the base year level of the math performance
measure, nor the change in the performance measure (as we have
oefined it) could logically have been used in making the salary
change decision. The lagged math performance measure is, in a
temporal sense. a logically correct variable to use and it is
positively associated with salary changes for superintendents who
do not change Joos.
What about the effects of performance on the salary changes
of superintendents who change jobs? Here, the evidence is a bit
more mixed. The derived estimates (from the stayer and
interaction coefficients) of the effects of performance on
movers' salary changes are found in the notes toTable 8.
Following the same reasoning as above, it is the lagged
performance level variables that logically might effect salary
changes. However,.while lagged tax performance is positively
associated with earnings gains for superintendents who change
jobs. lagged math test performance is negatively associated.
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V. Pertormance and tlobilitv
As Table 2 indicates, each year- roughly 5 percent of the
superintendents in our sample moved to another school district in
New York State, while roughly 10 percent dropped out of the
sample. Among the former group, approximately 80 percent
received salary increases, while 20 percent received the same
salary after moving or suffered wage cuts. Finally,
approximately 85 percent of the sample continued in their same
positions. What determines in which of the four states (move to
another district with S>0, move to another district with S<0,
leave the sample, or stay in the same position) each observation
is located?
To answer this question, we estimated models of the form
(8) log () = d0 + dY + dS + d3,T + d4E +E
J = 1,2,3
where Y Is a vector of characteristics of the school district
(a subset of the X), S is the vector of superintendent
characteristics, and T and E are the relevant tax rate and
educational test score performance measures. The notation
P(state=j) denotes the probability that an individual is in
state j, with the four states being change districts with a
salary increase, change districts with no salary Increase or a
salary decrease, leave the sample, and continue on in the same
district, respectively. Under suLtable assumptions about the
distribution of the error term5 (lognormal) the system In (8)
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represents a multinornial logit model and can be estimated by
standard maximum likelihood methods.25
Table 9 presents the estimates of one specification of
equation (8) (that uses the lagged level performance measures),
both for the 4-way dichotomy that includes people who left the
sample and the 3-way dichotomy that excludes this group. The
table indicates that the vectors of parameters that determine the
logarithm of the ratios of the odds of being in the other three
groups is virtually identical for the two models; this is to be
expected given the U irrelevance of alternative option° property
of the multinomial logit model.
Quite striking, the lagged tax level performance measure is
positively associated with the odds of moving to a higher paying
job (relative to staying) and negatively associated with the odds
of moving to a lower paying job relative to staying. Put another
way, among movers the better lagged tax level performance is, the
more likely the individual will move to a better job. On-the-job
financial performance does affect school superintendents'
futures. The math performance variable, however, Is always
insignificant, perhaps because of the reasons discussed in
Section III.
As suggested from the cross-section results found in Table
4, having a doctorate degree increases a superintendent's chances
of moving to a better paying job relative to his chances of not
moving. Older superintendents are less likely to move to another
job, and more likely to leave the sample, both relative to
25
stavina ifl the same district. The former clearly reflects
voluntary mobility declining with age and the latter reflects
retirement rates increasing with age. Superintendents with more
previous experience as a superintendent in other districts are
more likely to move to both higher or lower paying jobs relative
to staying in the same district: this may well reflect
heterogeneity of turnover probabilities.27 Finally, being
employed in a school district with high median family income
reduces the prodability of moving to a higher paying job relative
to the prooability of staying. s indicated in Table 3, higher
income school districts pay more, thereby reducing the likely
gain to mooility.
In fact, this latter result suggests that some measure of
the superintendents potential gain from mobility should be
directly included in these equations. We experimented with four
such measures: the logarithm of his base year salary, his
residual from a base year log salary equation that included only
superintendents characteristics, his residual from a base year
log salary equation that included both superintendents and
school district characteristics, and his residual from a
comprenerisive base year log salary equation that also included
performance measures. However, none of these measures proved to
be statistically significant (when they were includeo one at a
time), nor, did their inclusion affect the pattern of signs and
significance of the coefficients in Table 9.
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Finally, Table 10 indIcates the sensitivity of our mobility
results to the specification of the performance variables. As in
the salary change equations, four specifications were tested:
base year level, lagged year level, both base and lagged year
levels, and change in performance. The coefficients in this
table indicate quite clearly that only the lagged level of tax
performance matters, with better performance leading to an
increased (decreased) probability of mobility to a better paying
(not better paying) position relative to the probability of
remaining on the same job.28
VI. Concluding Remarks
Are school superintendents rewarded for "good performance"
by larger salary increases and/or greater opportunities for
mobility to higher paying positions?. Although the evidence we
have presented is not totally unambiguous, our.tentative answer
Is yes. Higher scores on the tax rate performance index in the
prior year are associated with greater (smaller) probabilities
that a superintendent will move to a better (poorer) paying job
relative to the probability of staying in the same district and,
for "movers", larger salary Increases. Higher scores on the
third grade mathematics test Index in the prior year are
associated with larger salary increases for stayers. However,
contrary to our expectations, this index Is also negatively
associated with salary increases for movers. It Is this latter
finding that gives us some pause as we draw conclusions.29
27
Of course, as noted above, there are many problems with our
educational performance index. It is based on a single subject
and grade level test and focuses on the lower tail of the
academic achievement distribution. This causes us to put more
weight on the tax rate findings, but also suggests that future
researchers might profitably examine a wider range of educational
outcome measures than we have.
Moreover, to say that the market for school superintendents
is implicitly behaving Has jfU there were merit pay for school
superintendents is not to say that the implicit incentives to
perform that superintendents face is sufficiently strong. Given
the responses to our survey's question on the criteria school
boards use in their evaluation of superintendents (Table 3), our
priors would lead us to be surprised if they were. Indeed, our
own estimates do suggest that these incentives are quite modest.
For example, the estimated coefficients In Table 8 suggest
that a superintendent who remained in the same district and kept
his district's math test performance index one standard deviation
above the mean performance index (which is zero), would receive
an annual salary increase that was only 0.3 percentage points
30higher, ceteris paribus, than a mean performer". If the
superintendent maintained this level of performance over a ten—
year- period he would find his salary level at the end of the
period only slightly more than 3 percentage points higher,
ceteris paribus, than that of the mean performer. Similarly,
they suggest that, among superintendents who moved to another
28
position, those wnose aistricts tax rate Performance index was
one standard deviation above the mean tax rate per-formance (which
again is zero, would receive a salary increase upon moving that
was only 1.7 percentaae points higher, ceteris paribus. than the
salary increase that a "mean performing mover" would receive.31
Neither of these magnitudes would appear to provide a strong
incentive for superintendents to perform wel 1.
On the other hand, the coefficients in Table 9 do suggest
that tax rate performance does substantially influence mobility
prospects. Ceteris paribus, a superintendent whose districts
tax rate performance was one standard deviation above the mean
would increase the ratio of his probability of moving to a better
paying job relative to his probability of staying in the same
district by 40 percent and decrease the ratio of the probability
of his moving to a poorer paying job relative to the probability
of staying oy 37 percent.32 These ratios, however, on average
are very small -— .038 (46/1207) and .016 (19/1207) -- so one may
question wnether even these mobility effects are of sufficient
magnitude to provide the appropriate incentives for performance.
As such, some education of school board memoers on the potential
gains from using formal merit pay plans that focus on aesired
educational and financial outcomes, rather than on public
relations type measures, may well be in order.
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Footnotes
1. See, for example, Samuel Bacharach, David Lipsky, and
Joseph Shedd (1984) and Richard Murnane (1984) for discussions of
the difficulties involved with merit pay plans for teachers.
Among the problems they highlight are the often zero-sum nature
of such plans (a fixed sum to divide among teachers), the
difficulties of measuring individual teacher performance, and the
historic opposition of teachers' unions to merit pay.
2. Studies of "effective schools" (where students
uperformancell exceed one's expectations, given the
characteristics of the students, their environment, and the
resources devoted to their education) point to the important
Instructional leadership role of the principal. For discussions.
of the effective school literature, see S. Bossert, et al.
(1982), David Kroeze (1982), and Phillip Hallinger and Joseph
Murphy (1982).
3. See George Milkovich and Jerry Newman (1984).
Individual Incentive plans should be distinguished from group
incentive plans, such as prof1t-harlng plans, that tend to cover
a wider range of employees. The latter have become more
prevalent In recent years as a substitute for wage increases In
industries facing serious economic problems.
There Is, of course, a large theoretical literature on the
importance of structuring private sector corporate executives
compensation so that they have incentives to perform in the best
interest of shareholders (i.e., to solve the principal—agent
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problem). A substantial empirical literature, see ror example
Michael Jensen and Jerold Zimmerman (1985), who summarize a
symposium in the May 1985 issue of the Journal of Accounting and
Economics, addresses whether such a nexus appears to exist in the
private sector. Our work is in the spirit of these latter
studies. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there is only a very
limited empirical literature on whether private sector
corporations that tie executive compensation to "performance"
actually "outperform" other firms. Robert Macson (1971) is an
example of this literature.
4. For surveys of the teachers' salary literature, see
Ronald Ehrenberg and Joshua Schwarz (1986) and David Lipsky
(1982).
5. Some case studies and statistical analyses of
superintendents turnover and mobili-ty have been conducted; see,
for example. Michael Berger (1983), Steven Kneevich (1971), and
James C. March and James G. March (1977, 1978). Some comparative
data on superintendents' salaries has also been published; see,
for example, American Association of School Administrators (1979)
and Kriezevich. None of these, however, attempted to measure
"performance" and to see if it matters; indeed, March and March
(1977) argued that the mobility of superintendents is almost a
random process. Their approach, however, was criticized by David
Schmittlein and Donald Morrison (1981).
6. Our focus is on school superintendents because they are
the chief operating officers of school districts and their
34
salaries are determined through individual mnegotiationsh1 with
school boards. In contrast, especially in larger districts,
school principals tend to be members of a union and their salary
increases negotiated collectively; this limits the likelihood of
observing individual principals' salaries being related to their
performance.
7. A district can simultaneously have high test scores and
low tax rates, relative to Icornparableu districts in the state,
if the districts administrators efficiently manage both
financial and educational (i.e., staff) resources and effectively
motivate school district personnel
8. Gerald Goldstein and Ponald Ehrenberg (1976).
9. Previous studies suggest that the vast majority of
superintendents, possibly as high as 90 percent, serve in only
one state during their lifetime (Knezevich (1971)). Thus it may
be reasonable to assume that the number in this last category who
move out of state in our sample is small.
10. As noted in the table, between 20 to 65 percent of the
observations were missing at least one of the other
superintendents'S characteristic variables. To omit these
observations would have decimated our sample. Instead, dummy
variables for nonreporting of each of these variables were
included in the analyses and variables that were not reported
were assigned the value of zero. See G. S. Maadala (1977) for a
discussion of estimation when observations on some variables are
missing.
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ii. We say his" throughout, because over 97 percent of the
approximately 1.010 superintendents who appear in our sample
anytime curing the rive—year period were males. Squared values
Ot . and (which a pure "human capitalist' might asert
belong in the analyses) never proved significant, primarily we
suspect because of the small age range over which S5 varied
(most superintendents are over 40) and the large number of
observations for which S3 and 54 were not reported.
12. We stress these are the superintendents' perceptions;
school board members might respond differently.
13. We are grateful to Dr. Gordon Bruno, Superintendent of
the Ithaca, NY City School District, for suggesting we include
this request in our survey.
14. We isolate the third grade mathematics test because it
was the only one of the four tests that did riot undergo revision
during the period anc that was given in all fIve years. As a
result, while the entire battery of tests, can be used to
construct a performance measure when analyzing a single year's
cross—section. suosequent sections' longitudinal analyses, which
pool data across years, are restricted to using the single third
grade mathematics test.
15. These, unfortunately, were the only test score data
that the New York State Education Department could provide us.
It obviousiy would have been preferable to have test scores for
older students and also to focus some attention on the upper tail
of the achievement distribution. For example, data on high
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school graduation rates, or on the fraction of seniors going on
to higher education would have been desirable. Our focus on the
lower tail of the elementary school student test distribution
imparts additional error to our educational performancemeasures,
as does our ignoring other aspects of educational performance
that are not easily measured (e.g., teaching students to write,
or instilling a sense of social responsibility in them).
16. This restriction to "stayers1 leads to obvious
selectivity problems (see James Heckman (1979)) as it ignores the
return to performance that comes from increased opportunity for
mobility. This issue is addressed in the next section.
17. Data from the first academic year in the sample, 1978-
79, is used only to construct the lagged performance measures for
1979-80.
18. If some of the included variables are proxies f or the
•omltted ones and if these included ones are correlated with our
performance measures, other (measurement error) problems may
arise and the bias cannot always be signed. On this, see Zvi
Grillches (1977).
19. A similar criticism applies, of course, to the earlier
work of Goldstein and Ehrenberg (1976).
20. See Jerry Hausman (1978) for a discussion of the fixed-
effects model.
21. Strictly speaking, at first glance flrst-differencing
may appear to eliminate the fixed effect only for stayers.
Letting J be the district superintendent I is in In period
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t—1 (and prior-) ano k be the district he is in in period t,
-
the generalization of (7) for movers would be
log (W kt/W
t
= a0 + al(Xk_XJ 1 + 2(St-Sti)
+ a (T. —T. ) + (E. -E. )3 ijt—1 ijt—2 4 ijt—1 ijt—2
+ (Vk_Vj) +
However, since presumably P(VT1ti) = P(V,Tjit2) and
P(V.E. ) = P(V.,E. ), first—differ-encing should eliminatej ijt—1 j ijt—2
omitted varaible bias for movers as well.
22. The other district and superintendent characteristics
(in X and S) rarely changed, save for movers, and they are
excluded here to avoid severe collinearity problems.
23. As above, inclusion of the superintendent-s salary in
the base year did not alter any of the other coefficients. For
the subset of school districts for -which we had teacher salary
data, we also attempted to test if school superintendents' salary
changes were related to the salary changes of teachers in their
schoo' districts. This variable, however, never proved
statistically significant.
24. These results are fully consistent with the cross-
section salary equations found in Table 3.
25. See Madalla (1983).
26. See. especially, footnote 15.
27. For discussions of methods to try to distinguish
heterogeneity bias from other factor-s (i.e., state dependence),
38
see Chamoerlain (1981) and Heckman (1981). Since this issue is
not ot central importance to us, we do not pur ie these methods
here.
28. As Table 10 indicates, when the change in tax
performance specification is generalized and the base year and
lagged year level entered separately, only the latter matters.
29. An additional concern is that the productivity—salary
change-mobili-ty relationships that we observe may reflect
learning over time about superintendents' true productivity, and
then attempts to compensate them for this true productivity
rather than any incentive driven relationships. Kevin Murphy
(forthcoming) has proposed tests (in the context of corporate
executives compensation) to distin'uish between the "incentive"
and "learning" explanations. His tests require good data on
prior experience and job tenure (both are often missing in our
sarnp I e).
S
30. This is computed as the stayer coefficient for the
lagged math performance variable (.007) multiplied by the
standard deviation of the math performance variable (.46).
31. This is computed as the implied mover coefficient for
the lagged tax rate performance variable (.075) multiplied by the
standard deviation of the tax rate performance variable (.23).
32. These are calculated as exp((1.466)(.23)) minus one and
exp((-2.006)(.23)) minus one. respectively.
Table 1
School Superintendents' Salaries in
1978—79 to 1982—83
Number of
Districts
Reporting
S td.
Dev.
New York State:
Source: Authors' caldilations from data on the New York State
Education Department's "Basic Educational Data System"
School District Tapes for 1978—79 to 1982—83. Excluded
year are New York City, districts where the position is
and districts that failed to report salary information.
1978—79 701 34,964 8,325 17,500 58,500
1979—80 700 36,614 8,617 17,500 61,500
1980—81 698 38,936 8,978 18,500 64,500
1981—82 689 41,665 9,479 22,785 71,000
1982—83 675 44,227 9,887 20,000 71,000
(BEDS)
each
vacant,
Table 2
Mobility of School Superintendents
in New York State: 1978—79 to 1982—83
Years (A) (B) (C) (D)
1978—79 to 1979—80 727 610 (84%) 28 (4%) 89 (12%)
1979—80 to 1980—81-
•
719 624 (87%) 29 (4%) 66 (9%)
1980—81 to 1981—82 715 582 (81%) 42 (6%) 91 (13%)
1981—82 to 1982—83 720 634 (88%) 28 (4%) 58 (8%)
where
(A) — number of superintendents in the sample in the first year
(B) — number (percent)of superintendents in the first year who were in
the same district in the second year
(C) — number (percent) of superintendents in the first year who moved to
another district in the state in the second year
(D) — number (percent) of superintendents in the first year who were not
employed in any district in the sample in the second year
Source: Authors' calculations from data onthe New York State Education
Department's "Basic Educational Data System" (BEDS) School
District Tapes.
Table 3
Determinants of School Superintendents' Salaries in New York State:
Annual Cross—Sections
(absolute value of t statistics)
1980—8 1 198 1—82 1982—83
a
Exp. /Acad.
Var. /Year 1978—79
Logarithm
1979—80
of Annual Salary (SAL)
x1 .127(22.5) .113(20.0) .117(21.2) .111(20.7) .110(20.0)
x2 .045 (5.8) .025 (4.1) .028 (4.8) .019 (3.9) .011 (2.3)
X3 .191 (5.2) .228 (6.5) .228 (6.3) .273 (8.4) .294 (9.3)
X4 .151 (3.6) .146 (3.4) .189 (4.3) .152 (3.6) .120 (2.9)
x5 .178 (2.6) .072 (1.2) .032 (0.4) —.071 (1.0) —.111 (1.7)
x6 .357 (2.5) .449 (3.0) .367 (2.5) .445 (3.1) .494 (3.4)
. .200 (2.0) .009 (0.0) .027 (0.3) —.001 (0.0) .074 (0.8)
x8 —.073 (1.0) .022 (0.3) —.049 (0.7) —.036 (0.5) —.080 (1.0)
X9 .185 (1.8) —.147 (1.3) .105 (1.1) .224 (2.2) .218 (2.1).
x10 .014 (1.0) .025 (1.6) .000 (0.0) —.019 (1.2) —.012 (0.9)
S1 —.008 (0..7) .006 (0.6) .010 (1.0) .013 (1.4) .023 (2.3)
S2
.000 (0.0) —.016 (1.4) —.014 (1.3) —.032 (3.1) —.016 (1.7)
S3 .002 (1.1) —.000 (0.3) .001 (0.6) —.000 (0.1) —.000 (0.2)
S4 .006 (5.3) .006 (5.0) .006 (5.5) .004 (3.6) .007 (5.7)
S5 .002 (2.1) .003 (3.3) .002 (2.1) .002 (2.2) .001 (0.8)
2 .842 :845 .840 .836 .828
n 590 557 558 570
aAISO included were an intercept term and duunny variables for rionreportirig of
the superintendents' previous experience, current job tenure, and year of
bachelor's degree. Experience and job tenure were available for 35 to 65% of
the sample each year, while year since degree was typically available for
70 to 80% of the sample.
Table 3 (continued)
where
X1 = logarithm of total enrollment in the district in the year
X2 = logarithm of the full value of property in the district per enrolled
student in the year
X3 = logarithm of per capita personal income in the county in the year
X4 logarithm of median family income in the district in 1979
= 1979 percentage of the district's population that was nonwhite
X6 = 1979 percentage of the district's adult population with greater than
a college education
X7 = 1979 percentage of the district's households with children at home
X8 = 1979 percentage owner—occupied housing in the district
X9 = 1979 percentage of the district's adult population with some college
or a college degree
X10 = 1979 percentage of the district's population residing in urban areas
S1 = 1=superintendent had a doctoral degree in the year, O=no such degree
in year
S2 = 1=superintendent had a certificate of advanced study in the year,
O=no such degree
S3 = superintendent's total number of years experience in other school
districts as a superintendent
S4 = superintendent's years of tenure in the current district
S5 superintendent's years since receiving a bachelor's degree
Sources:
Authors' computations from:
1) Sal, X , X — New York State Education Department, "Basic Educational Data
System' (BEDS) School District Tapes for 1978—79 to 1982—83, and New York
State Education Department, "Financial Data System" (ST3) School District
Tapes for 1978—79 to 1982—83.
2) X3 — U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, unpublished
tabulations for 1978 to 1982.
3) to X10 — U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, School
District Data File for New York State.
4) S to S4 — American Association of School Administrators, Who's Who in
Eucational Administration, 1976—77, 1980—81 editions and the survey of
school superintendents in New York State conducted by the authors in
the summer of 1985.
Table 4
School Superintendents' Characteristics and the Size
and Wealth of the District in Which They Are Employeda
(absolute value of t statistics)
Acad.
Var./Year 1978—79
Logarithm of
1979—80
Per Student Full Value
1980—81 1981-82 • 1982—83
S1 .113 (1.7) .115 (1.4) .144 (1.8) .147 (1.6) .205 (2.3)
S2 .016 (0.2) .153 (1.5) .096 (1.0) .208 (2.0) .118 (1.2)
S3 —.006 (0.6) —.001 (0.0) .003 (0.3) .007 (0.6) .006 (0.6)
S5 .010 (1.8) .011 (1.7) .005 (0.9) .010 (1.3) .004 (0.6)
2 .016 .006 .010 .024 .025
n 596 563 565 576 579
Logarithm of Total Enrollment
1978—79 1979—80 1980—81 1981—82 1982—83
S1 .738 (8.0) .733 (7.9) .741 (8.0) .702 (7.8) .720 (8.1)
S2
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.033 (0.3)
.021 (1.6)
.005 (0.0)
.017 (1.3)
.019 (0.2) .115 (1.1)
.008 (0.7) .016 (1.5)
.072 (0.8)
.016 (1.6)
S5 .033 (4.4) .035 (4.6) .033 (4.5) .035 (5.0) .034 (4.8)
2 .180 .190 .177 .190 .199
n 596 563 565 576 579
aJ50 included in the analyses are an intercept term and dummy variables for
nonreporting of year of bachelor's degree and years of experience as a
superintendent prior to current job. All variables are defined as in Table 3.
Table 5
New York State Public School Superintendents' Perceptions
of the Criteria School Boards Use in
Evaluating Their Performancea
Responses
-
Number
1) Overall Response to the Survey 496
2) Response to Question on Criteria Used in Evaluation 397
3) Mentioned that Criteria Included:
a) Community/Pubic Relations 318
b) School Board Relations 294
c) Staff and Personnel Management 287
d) Fiscal Management 267
e) Curriculum Development, Educational Planning
and Leadership 202
f) Professional and Personal Development 132
g) General Management and Administration 129
h) Academic Performance and Achievement 125
i) Facilities Management 50
j) Student Services and Relations 49
k) Student Discipline 26
1) Parent Relations 25
4) Included a Formal Evaluation Instrument 86
aResponses from the approximately 700 school superintendents in New York
State (excluding New York City) to a survey conducted by the authors In
May to July of 1985. Response rates did not vary substantially across
size classes of school districts.
Table 6
1979—80 Tax Rate and Educational Outcome Equations
(absolute value of t statistics)
Explanatory!
Variables !Outcome log(T) log(GM) log(AS)
X2 —.100 (7.0) —.036 (1.2) —.033 (1.6)
x3 —.001 (0.0) —.243 (1.3) —.029 (0.2)
X4 .180 (1.8) —.253 (1.2) —.397 (2.8)
X5 .691 (4.6) 1.351 (4.2) 1.111 (5.2)
X6 1.009 (2.8) —1.331 (1.8) —1.801 (3.5)
X7 .979 (3.7) .670 (1.2) .374 (1.0)
—.417 (2.1) —.689 (1.7) —.653 (2.3)
X9 .388 (1.4) —.685 (1.2) —.634 (1.7)
x10 .271 (7.6) —.042 (0.6) —.009 (0.2)
D .006 (0.1) .278 (2.9) .205 (3.1)
2 .457 .184 .349
n 573 565 568
where 1
T = full value property tax rate in the school district in 1979—80
CM percentage of the district's students who scored below the
state reference point on standardized 6th grade mathematics
exam in 1979—80
AS = average of the percentages of the district's students who fell
below the state reference point on standardized 3rd and 6th
grade reading and mathematics exams in 1979—80
D 1=city school district (school board sets tax rate), 0=other
school district (voters approve school budget in annual
referendum)
Sources: Authors' calculations from:
1) to X10 — defined as before, see Table 3.
2) T — New York State Education Department, "Financial Data System" (ST3)
School District Tape for 1979—80.
3) GM, AS — New York State Education Department, Pupil Evaluation Program
(PEP) Test Scores.
Table 7
Effects of Performance Measures on School Superin'tendents'
Salaries: Annual Cross—Sections of ttStayerstta
(absolute value of t statistics)
Pooled
1979—80 to
1982—831979—80 1980—81 1981—82 1982—83
Model 1
TP —.026 (1.5) —.029 (1.5) —.008 (0.4) .004 (0.3) —.022 (2.3)
NP .016 (1.7) —.013 (1.5) .004 (0.5) .016 (2.0) .005 (1.1)
Model 2
TP —.026 (1.5) —.028 (1.5) —.007 (0.4) .005 (0.3) —.022 (2.3)
Al' .016 (1.7) —.003 (0.2) .020 (1.7) .012 (1.4) .013 (2.3)
aEach equation also includes all of the variables found in Table 3.
(across years) equations also include year dummy variables.
The pooled
TP — tax performance measure = log (predicted tax rate) minus log (actual tax
rate) in the previous academic year.
NP — math performance measure = log (predicted percentage of students who fell
below state reference point on 6th grade.math test) minus log (actual
percentage) in the previous academic year.
Al' — average educational performance measure = log (predicted average percentage
of students who fell below state reference point on 3rd and 6th grade
reading and math tests) minus log (actual percentage) in the previous
academic year.
Positive values for each performance measure indicate above average performance.
Table 8
Salary Change Equations for Superintendents Who Stay in
the Same Position or Move to Another Position
in New York Statea
(absolute value t statistics)
C
Y8 1
Y82
M
% iY
MP
TP
MPB
TPB
MPL
TPL
M*Z LY
M*ZE
M*Z M
M*tNP
M*TP
M*MP
M*TPB
(1)
.061 (37.9)
.020 ( 7.3)
.006 C 2.3)
.060 (10.0)
(2)
.077 (8.5)
.010 (2.9)
—.003 (0.5)
—.063 (5.0)
—.098 (1.2)
—.010 (0.2)
.004 (0.6)
—.005 (1.7)
.007 (0.6)
.446 (5.3)
.120 (3.0)
.052 (4.1)
°
.052 (2.9)
—.331 (4.5)
(3)
.074 (9.6)
.018 (6.3)
.003 (0.7)
—.050 (4.7)
—.120 (1.7)
.010 (0.3)
.004 (0.7)
.002 (0.8)
.005 (1.0)
.411 (5.5)
.093 (2.9)
.013 (1.5)
.009 (0.6)
—.013 (0.5)
(4)
.079 (8.7)
.010 (3.0)
—.004 (0.8)
—.055 (4.4)
—.110 (1.4)
—.004 (0.1)
.003 (0.5)
.007 (2.5)
.008 (1.3)
.425 (5.0)
.105 (2.6)
.052 (4.1)
M*MPL —.038 (2.8)
M*TPL .067 (2.2)
n 2208 1200 1901 1210
.066 .331 .260 .322
aIncluding the log of the base period salary as an additional explanatory
variable only marginally affected the other coefficients.
Table 8 (continued)
where
Y81 1 if 1980—81 to 1981—82 change observation, 0 otherwise
Y82 1 if 1981—82 to 1982—83 change observation, 0 otherwise
M 1move to another superintendency in New York State; 0=other
ZtY change in the logarithm of per capita personal income in the county
the superintendent's school district is located in from the base
(first) to new (second) year
Z1E change in the logarithm of total enrollment in the superintendent's
school district from the base to new year
ZM change in the logarithm of the full value of property per enrolled
student in the superintendent's school district from the base to the
new year
tMP, ETP change in the math test (tax rate) performance measure from the lagged
(year prior to the base) to the base year
TPB math test (tax rate) performance measure in the base year
TPL math test (tax rate) performance measure in the lagged year
and
Implied Effects of Performance
Variables on the Salary
Correlation Matrix of Changes of Movers
Performance Measures
(2) (3) (4)
.522 .082 .060 MP .047(2.6) NP .011(0.8) MPL —.032(2.4)
.061 .066 TP —.324 (4.5) TPB —.008 (0.3) TPL .075(2.5)
.891
'L TPB TPL
Table 9
Multinomial Logit Analysesa
(absolute value t statistics)
P(move,S>O)
P(stay)
4—Way Dichotomy
P(move, 0)
P (stay)
P(leave sample)
P (stay)
3—Way Dichotomy
P(move,S>0)
P (stay)
P(move ,SO)
P(stay)
C 45.263 (4.2) 13.167 (1.0) —5.494 (1.3) 43.996 (4.1) 13.193 (1.0)
Y81 .645 (1.8) .071 (0.1) .530 (2.3) .656 (1.8) .114 (0.2)
Y82 —1.670 (2.8) .149 (0.2) .054 (0.2) —1.671 (2.7) .180 (0.3)
L —.128 (0.4) —.448 (0.8) —.255 (1.1) —.147 (0.4) —.487 (0.9)
TPL
CDEG
1.466
.050
(2.0)
(0.1)
—2.006
—.029
(1.7)
(0.0)
—.176
—.194
(0.4)
(0.4)
1.460
.063
(2.0)
(0.1)
—2.136
—.035
(1.7)
(0.0)
DDEG 1.307 (3.0) .586 (0.9) .368 (1.3) 1.292 (2.9) .579 (0.9)
AGE —.062 (1.9) —.049 (0.8) .089 (3.8) —.055 (1.7) —.045 (0.8)
TEN —.014 (0.2) .075 (1.1) —.004 (0.1) —.020 (0.3) .071 (1.0)
EXP .121 (3.0) .144 (2.2) —.086 (0.7) .120 (3.0) .144 (2.2)
LENR
—.009 (0.3) .039 (0.1) .037 (0.3) —.056 (0.2) .039 (0.1)
LFULL —.202 (0.7) .164 (0.8) —.164 (1.1) —.256 (0.9) .156 (0.8)
LMPI
—4.637 (3.9) —1.927 (1.4) —.254 (0.5) —4.462 (3.7) —1.946 (1.4)
included in the analyses were dummy variables for nonreporting of age
a
Also
tenure at base year j
Total Observations
Stayers
Move ,S >0
Move,SO
Leave Sample
ob, and experience as a superintendent on previous jobs.
4—Way DIchotomy 3—Way Dichotomy
1,408 1,272
1,207 1,207
46 46
19 19
136 —
1=superintendent has a certificate of advanced study, 0=other
1superintenderit has a doctorate, 0=other
superintendent's age
superintendent's tenure in current job
superintendent's years experience as a superintendent in previous jobs
logarithm of total enrollment in base year school district
logarithm of full value per pupil in base year school district
logarithm of 1979 median family income in base year school district
rzhere: CDEG
DDEG
AGE
TEN
EXP
LENR
LFULL
LMFI
Table 10
Summary of Performance Variable Coefficients, Various
Multinomial Logit Specifications: 4—Way Dichotomya
(absolute value t statistjcs)
P(move,S>0) P(move,S.0) P(leave sample)
P(stay) P(stay) P(stay)
—.173 (0.6) —.588 (1.2) —.200 (1.2)
TPB .278 (0.4) —1.322 (1.4) —.075 (0.2)
—.128 (0.4) —.449 (0.8) —.255 (1.2)
TPL 1.466 (2.0) —2.001 (1.7) —.176 (0.4)
—.461 (1.0) —.057 (0.1) —.071 (0.3)
TPB —1.505 (0.9) 1.203 (0.7) .464 (0.5)
.069 (0.1) —.893 (1.3) —.209 (0.8)
TPL 2.778 (1.9) —2.646 (1.4) —.509 (0.5)
MP
—.273 (0.8) .324 (0.6) .056 (0.3)
LTP —2.355 (1.6) 1.403 (0.9) .391 (0.4)
aA1SO included in each model were all of the explanatory variables found in the
models in Table 9. When either the logarithm of the base year salary, the
residual from a salary equation that included only characteristics of the
superintendent, the residual from a salary equation that included character-
istics of the superintendent and the school district in which he was employed,
or the residual from salary equations thatalso included performance measures,
were included in the models, the pattern of signs and signifiance of the
coefficients in this table were not altered. Moreover, neither the wage level,
nor any of the residuals, ever proved to be statistically significant.
